Cook's writings on trusts, on industrial concentration, and on railroads grew out of his law practice, which began in New York City in 1882, shortly after his law·school graduation, in the employment of Frederic B. Coudert. 3 Through the Coudert office Cook met John W. Mackay, 4 who had made a fortune in Nevada's Comstock lode and moved to New York in 18835 -the same year in which Cook was admitted to the New York bar.6 In 1884, Mackay co-founded the Commercial Cable Company, which laid a transatlantic cable from New York to London and the Continent.7 When Western Union refused to relay Commercial Cable's messages in the United States, Mackay established the Postal Telegraph Company, and it proceeded to wage a price war with Western Union.s
Cook became Mackay's personal counsel,9 and this association gave him the opportunity to make investments that were eventually worth millions of dollars. 1° Cook's philippic against monopolies and trusts 11 appeared at the time when Mackay was struggling to break the monopoly power of Western Union.12 Coincidentally, the principal owner of Western Union was Jay Gould, 1 corporations· had supplied most of the corporate litigation up to Kyd's time.
Angell and Ames's principal subjects of discussion were churches, charities, and universities, as Kyd?s had been. 21 Later editions recognized that the rapid increase of "joint-stock corporations" called for separate attention, 22 but'these editions included no distinct treatment of the joint stock corporation's attributes. Angell and Ames focused their attention on topics critical to religious and eleemosynary corporations such as means of creation -prescription, common law, and legislative acts,23 corporate capacity to acquire and alienate property, 24 and the necessity of a corporate seal to bind a corporation to a contract.25 In these areas, the law was concerned with the relation between the corporation, viewed as a unit, and the state or outsiders with whom the corporation might deal. Angell and Ames paid scarcely any attention to the conflicting interests of a corporation's internal constituents -its members and its managers.
Angell and Ames's text, even in the 1882 edition, remained singularly silent on the :financial outrages that had occurred in railroad :financing during the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s. 2 6 Thousands of shares had been forged, thousands issued in violation of court orders, and thousands issued for face values far in excess of what was paid for them.27 Angell and Ames's treatise made no mention of "stock watering," which had caused insolvencies and had probably accentuated the panics of 1857 and 1873. Their treatise gave a few pages to the rights of "members" to sue their corporations for payment of debts or dividends,28 and to enjoin actions that are beyond the corporation's charter powers,2 9 but Angell and Ames's text made no suggestion that a shareholder could sue on the corporation's behalf for officers' or directors' frauds or neglects.3o
Some authors who preceded Cook made minor additions to the analyses of Kyd and of Angell and Ames.31 George W. Field in 1877 introduced an exposition of the powers of directors;3 2 Angell and Ames had mingled directors with other "agents" in their last edition. 33 Victor Morawetz in 1882 prophetically attacked the doctrine of ultra vires. 34 Although Cook's predecessors cited cases that arose out of the scandals of the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s, their texts paid scant attention to the abusive practices that gave rise to the scandals. 35 Platt Potter captured the prevailing spirit of treatise writers of the age in the preface of his 1881 treatise when he wrote:
In the performance of this task, it may be needless to remark that no change in the established general principles of the law of corporations has been attempted; these principles, as found laid down in the elementary works of Blackstone and Kent, are unchanged, and will forever remain the same; they are expressed by those authors in the most simple language, and yet with classic elegance which no time will improve. 3 6 30. Angell and Ames cited the right of a shareholder to sue an outsider on behalf of the corporation -established by Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. {18 How.) 331 (1855) 36. POTTER, TREATISE supra note 31, at v. Potter was, however, very conscious of the tremendous expansion of corporations, about which, he noted with evident misgivings: "It seems to have been, and is, the growing policy of the state to give countenance and encouragement .... " Id. at iii. But he disavowed any evaluation of the phenomenon in his treatise, explaining: "We do not intend -it is not our purpose -in our treatment of this subject, to be regarded as pronouncing this policy to be a sound one, or this condition of things to be the most wise; those considerations are not legitimately within the scope of this work." Id. at iv.
No such deference to earlier authors infected the writing of William W. Cook. After recognizing that others had adequately developed some parts of the ll:!-W of corporations, he observed:
As regards the important subject of Stock and Stockholders, however, there has been a singular deficiency in the text-books . . . . It was found that many of the most important and practical principles governing stocks had never been.investigated and presented bylaw writers. [p. v] Cook made it clear that it was his own analyses and his own opinions that entered into his treatise. He explained: "The plan of the work is original, and this volume is the result of a long and conscientious study of the sources of authority -the cases themselves .... [The writer] has not hesitated to express his opinion when the occasion seemed to warrant it" (p. vi).
Cook's innovation was to focus on the rights of investors and on the abuse of investors by corporate promoters and managers. His novel title, Stock and Stockholders, signaled the change. The outrages that had been committed in railroad financing just before and after the Civil War made evident the need for a systematic approach to the rights of investors. By directing attention to the interests of investors, Cook initiated the orientation of corporation law toward the demands of capitalism.
In a radical departure from earlier literature, Cook opened his analysis of stock issuance with a vivid description of offensive practices, declaring:
It is no unusual thing for a newly organized railroad corporation to issue to a construction company, bonds and stock whose par value is many times the value of the construction wor~ done .... Soo¥, however, default is made in the payment of the interest on the bonds, and this is followed by corporate insolvency, foreclosure, receivership, and reorganization. The issue of fictitiously paid up stock is the favorite device of corporate promoters, organizers, and manipulators, in carrying out their plans of realizing enormous gains from small investments, and in accumulating great fortunes at the expense of the public. [p. 23] After this spirited introduction, Cook expounded the case law of stock issuance in prose as dull as any other legal writer's, but he introduced a new rationale for shareholders' liability. Unlike his predecessors, who had treated "capital stock" as merely the sum of shareholders' interests in the company, 37 Cook defined "capital stock" as "the sum fixed by the corporate charter as the amount 37. Although Angell and Ames captioned one chapter "Of the Nature and Transfer of Stock in Joint-Stock Incorporated Companies," they offered no definition of "stock" beyond what might be implied by the statement: "By the term 'joint-stock' corporation, we would be understood to mean such a corporation as has for its object a division of profits among its stockholders." ANGELL & AME.s, TREATISE, supra note 2, at 589 (11th ed. 1882).
paid in or to be paid in by the stockholders ... " (p. 3), thus supplying a link between stockholding and liability. Cook's recognition of capital as a fixed sum enabled him to give a lucid explanation of "watered or :fictitious stock'' and the liabilities of its holders.38
In this and other chapters, Cook devoted 250-odd pages to liabilities of shareholders for corporate debts.39 He also explained "overissue," the issuance of more shares than authorized by corporate charters (pp. 300-06), which had escaped the attention of Angell and Ames.
In addition to exposing the evils of stock watering, Cook opened a new branch of doctrine under the title of his thirty-ninth chapter, "Fraudulent Acts of Directors, Majority of Stockholders, and Third Persons" (p. 666). As he had done in his chapter on shareholder liability, Cook began by describing the abuses that he saw in the marketplace. He declared:
Corporations, with their vast capital stock, their great income, their rapidly changing personal property, and their large purchases and sales, have proved to be a temptation which corporate officers are too often unable to withstand. These companies have been found to be efficient instruments of fraud, speculation, plunder, and illegal gain. In these latter days the robbery and spoliation of corporations and stockholders by the corporate directors and managers have been systematized into well-known methods of proceeding, and the carrying out of such plans has become a profession and an accomplishment. The skill, audacity, experience, and talent of the highest order of administrative ability have reduced to a certainty the methods of diverting profits, capital, and even the existence of the corporation itself, to the enrichment of the corporate managers and their co-conspirators. Corporations become insolvent and stockholders lose their investments, while individuals become millionaires. Illegitimate gains are secured and enormous fortunes are amassed by the few at the expense of the defrauded, but generally helpless, stockholders. [p. 667] Cook pursued his exposure of directors' misdeeds with an exposition of the theory and justification of "stockholders' suits" (pp. 669-73), which would become a central concern of corporation lawyers, writers, and teachers in the twentieth century as "shareholders' derivative suits." 40 Another area in which Cook recognized the inadequacy of existing law was the transfer of stock. In 1887, shares of stock were 38. Pp emphatically nonnegotiable (pp. 417-18), and purchasers incurred a host of risks -that the shares were not fully paid for, or that they were subject to a lien, or that a :fiduciary had transferred the shares in violation of the terms of a trust (pp. 422-31). Some of these problems would not be alleviated until the promulgation of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act in 1909, 4 1 and others not until the promulgation of the revised Uniform Commercial Code in 1956. 4 2 Cook foresaw the burgeoning importance of share transfers and the need for free transferability. He declared:
Beyond all question, the surplus wealth of the future will be invested in corporate bonds and stocks. It is well, then, in these days of the formative period of the law governing stock, that the principles governing the transfer of certificates should be formed for the protection and security of an investing public, against secret liens, attachments, claims, and negligence of both the corporation and third persons.43
After publishing three editions of Stock and Stockholders, Cook changed the title of his treatise to Corporations44 and added chapters on debt securities and on "quasi-public" corporations such as railroad, telegraph, telephone, gas, electric, and water companies. He also added a volume consisting of the texts of various statutory and constitutional provisions affecting corporations. But the first fifty-two chapters of Corporations retained the order and content of Stock and Stockholders, modified only by expansion. 45 The book had now grown to 2,660 pages, filling three volumes.
Cook opened some of his new topics, like some of his original chapters, with summaries of the business practices underlying the law. Cook, however, viewed the practices that he now described more sympathetically than he had. viewed stock watering. Explaining the rise of corporate mortgages, he observed: 41 Great captains of industry arose, such as Vanderbilt and Huntington, who had no capital, but had force and daring, coupled with a genius for building, consolidating, stocking, and bonding great systems of railroads. The power to mortgage gave them the power to raise money, and the power to raise money gave them the power to make America what it is today.46
Four more editions of Cook's Corporations treatise followed without major change in design or emphasis. Although the number of v~lumes doubled from four in the fourth edition to eight in the eighth edition, much ·of the text remained unchanged; most of the expansion appeared in footnotes, which often contained significant analysis as well as case citations and summaries.47
Before 1923, when Cook's last edition was published, a major change had taken place in the law affecting "watered stock," which Cook had denounced in earlier editions (p. 23). Many of the major commercial states had destroyed the basis of liability on watered stock by authorizing the issuance of stock without par value. 4 8 In response to these changes, Cook published in the Michigan Law Review an analysis of the cpnsequences of eliminating par value. 4 9 Cook thought that issuing stock without par value was not a cure for watering; it, he said, merely "conceals the mystery of the 'water' ."50 Columbia University economist John Bonbright expressed a similar view some years later. 51 Cook also claimed that "[t]he English way is better," 52 and endorsed the principle of "truth in securities," which would become the touchstone of American stock market reform in the 1930s.5 3 He quoted with approval a British government publication that declared:
The trend of recent legislation in this country has been to endeavor to afford information concerning joint stock companies to all who may 46. 3 id. at 1782a. But earlier volumes retained remarks on financial abuses without change. See 1 id. at 84-85 (discuss_ing watered stock); 2 id. at 1256 (discussing the frauds of directors and managers).
47. In the eighth edition, for example, 6 pages on watered stock contained 13 lines of text and 600 hundred lines of footnotes. 1 Coo1<, TREATISE, supra note 1, at 159-64 (8th ed. seek it, on the ground that publicity is the best protection which can be devised for the benefit of creditors and of investors .... 54 In the same article, Cook applauded the requirement of prior approval of stock issues by the Federal Interstate Commerce Commission, by state public service commissions, and by state commissions under "blue sky" laws, the origins of which he traced to a.Massachusetts law of 1875. 55 These laws, he concluded, "are based on the right principle." 56 Between the English system ·of full disclosure and the blue sky system of prior commission approval, Cook expressed no preference: "[T]he whole subject is still in the melting pot."57
While omitting prior editions' denunciation of watered stock, the eighth edition of Cook's treatise retained most of his earlier comments on the frauds of directors 58 and added an observation that implied approval of shareholders' derivative suits:
The expense, difficulty, and delays of litigation; the power and wealth of the guilty parties; the secrecy and skill of their methods; and the fact that the results of even a successful suit belong to the corporation, and not to the stockholders who sue, all tend to discourage the stockholders, and to encourage and protect the guilty parties. 59 Cook evidently viewed his eighth edition as the last of the series. Noting the unmanageable expansion of case law, he concluded that "[p]ractically the best future law books will have to emanate from law school professors."60 His most serious competitor, however, was probably not a professor, but Wtlliain Meade Fletcher, the author of an encyclopedic treatise whose first edition had appeared in 63 and characterized it as "an experiment to condense, simplify and clarify the law, for the use of the lawyer, law student and layman." 64 Reflecting on changes in the law since 1887, Principles rearranged and restated in a single volume most of the doctrine expounded in the treatise and made significant additions on trusts, 65 reorganization,6 6 and constitutional law.6 7
If Cook had condensed the footnotes of Principles and reorganized them to match the book's text, he would have provided a useful handbook and a fresh foundation for a twentieth century treatise. But Cook was evidently too weary for this task. Instead of winnowing his references to a concise few, he recurrently cited sections of his eighth edition, in which voluminous references could be found. 68 A practitioner qr student who wanted to use Principles as a research aid would have had to keep the six volumes of the eighth edition at hand for relevant citations. Nonlawyers, who might not have missed the citations, would have found the exposition of Principles too dense for easy comprehension. Unsurprisingly, the book was not commercially published. 69
COOK ON INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION
In 1888, when Cook had completed the first edition of Stock and Stockholders, "trusts" were igniting debates that would lead to the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. 7° Cook published a short tract on the evils of these concentrations of power. 71 His earlier protests against the frauds of corporate organizers and officers were mild in comparison with his denunciation of the evils of trusts. After explaining how manufacturers had resorted to trusts in order to restrain competition and establish monopolies, Cook declared: "A monopoly has ever been unjust, oppressive, and a thing of hatred,"72 and " [t] here can be no compromise between a monopoly and an Anglo-Saxon people. " 73 Cook's views were among those prominently noted six decades later in a leading history of antitrust law. 74 The wave of public opinion that led to the Sherman Antitrust Act was not directed narrowly at trusts, but ~t big companies in general. In reference to this hostility, Cook published, a year after the passage of the Sherman Act, a small book entitled The Corporation Problem. 15 Cook noted that after the Act's passage the former participants in trusts were reorganizing in giant corporations, with similar consequences. 76 These corporations were better than trusts, he thought, because their organization was not secret, and they were subject to explicit statutes and charters.77 But he reserved judgment on their legitimacy, concluding:
The first campaign of the warfare with the trusts has been fought out. The victory has been with the people. The trusts have been routed and driven to a second line of defence. They are entrenching themselves under the cover of corporate charters. Whether they shall be driven from these remains to be seen. Certain it is that unless they justify their existence they will be annihilated by the courts, legislatures, and new competitors. 78 Cook went on to recount the sins of corporations with all the vigor of a populist politician. Focusing on railroads, he described practices of rate discrimination, favoritism, wastefully duplicated lines, stock gambling, frauds on investors, monopolies, and political corruption. 79 Furthermore, he observed: "Whatsoever is an aid to plutocracy is a danger to the republic. The corporation is the ally, the agent, the representative of plutocracy." 80 But Cook was confident of the republic's survival. He reflected: "The corporation holds its life subject to the will of the people .... Its powers may be changed, its duties increased, its charter may be repealed and its existence ended." 81 Thanks to the power of the people, " 'The Corporation Problem' will be solved, and the solution, when it comes, will be satisfactory, thorough, and complete."82 Regrettably, Cook cf.id not specify the means of solution.
Thirty-four years later, Cook returned to the problem of monopoly in Principles. He outlined two schools of thought on the subject, one of which favored more legislation, more prosecutions, and more jail sentences; the other, which Cook described more sympathetically, relied on free trade and foreign competition to keep prices down. "Meantime," he concluded, "the courts are working out the problem, aided by a healthy public sentiment, which realizes the saving by combination and yet the danger of misuse of power."83 ,
COOK ON RAILROADS
Before, during, and after World War I, Cook concerned himself with railroad problems. 84 In 1915, he proposed a plan for reorganizing the railroads, which he presented almost simultaneously in the Michigan and Yale law reviews. 85 In the Michigan article, he stressed deficiencies of service to customers and of returns to investors. In his view, railroads were ground between the millstones of the public's demands for reasonable rates and financiers' demands for profits. 86 In the Yale article, Cook attacked the faults of management and the vacuity of managers' proposed solutions. He recalled that one railroad executive, in testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission, "solemnly asserted that the stockholders should take a more active part in corporate affairs."87 Adumbrating the work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, 88 Cook commented:
You might as well ask the clouds in the air to propel the railroad locomotives. The stockholders are multitudinous, widely scattered, many of them women and estates. They give their proxies to whom-. soever is in control -blindly and automatically .... They are derelicts adrift on an unknown sea, without chart, compass, landmark or pilot. 89 · Under· Cook's plan, the federal government would own a corporation that held controlling shares in the operating compames. The public would continue to ·hold other shares. Cook embodied his plan in a bill that was introduced in Congress but not enacted.9°
In 1919, Cook published a further elaboration of his plan and compared its merits with those of his competitors. The first element of his revised plan was to consolidate the hundreds of railroad companies into a few trunk lines arranged so that they would compete with each other but would use common terminals. 91 His second postulate was that government should either guarantee the railroads a reasonable return by payments from the public treasury or should set their rates at levels that would let them earn a fair retum.92 Third, the government should regulate the railroads but should not own them.93 Fourth, the major trunk lines should be federally incorporated -an idea as to which Cook declared "there is practically no dissent. "94 Although Cook's plan would have given a government agency voting control over railroad compapies, he insisted that this was not government ownership, 95 the avoidance of which was his central purpose:
The danger is that the 'public, out bf sheer disgust with present railroad rates and service, may abandon all real public control of the railroads, and allow the reactionaries to have their way. That way leads to still higher rates and ultimate Government ownership. 96 
SUMMATION
Cook was a leader in redirecting corporation theory from a system of state-given powers and disabilities to a structure of investors' rights and liabilities. He was among the first to recognize and to denounce the exploitation of investors by promoters and managers, and to proclaim the impotence of individual shareholders in rela-
